Section 306: Authorisation of expenditure in advance of appropriation
Constitution of Zimbabwe
(1) An Act of Parliament may allow the President to authorise the withdrawal of money from the Consolidated Revenue Fund to meet expenditure which was unforeseen or whose extent was unforeseen and for which no provision has been made under any other law, but—
(a) the Act must not allow the withdrawal of money in excess of one and one-half per cent
of the total amount appropriated in the last main Appropriation Act;
(b) any money withdrawn under the Act must be included in additional or supplementary
estimates of expenditure laid without delay before the National Assembly and, if the
Assembly approves the estimates, the money must be charged upon the Consolidated
Revenue Fund by an additional or supplementary Appropriation Act.
(2) If the Appropriation Act for a financial year has not come into operation by the beginning of that financial year, an Act of Parliament may allow the President to authorise the withdrawal of money from the Consolidated Revenue Fund to meet expenditure necessary to carry on the services of the Government for the first four months of the financial year, but—
(a) the Act must not allow the withdrawal of money in excess of one-third of the amounts
included in the estimates of expenditure for the previous financial year;
(b) any money withdrawn under the Act must be included in an Appropriation Act for the
financial year concerned, under separate votes for the different heads of expenditure.
(3) If Parliament is dissolved before adequate financial provision has been made for carrying on the services of the Government, an Act of Parliament may allow the President to authorise the withdrawal of money from the Consolidated Revenue Fund to meet expenditure needed to carry on those services until three months after the National Assembly first meets after the dissolution, but any money withdrawn under the Act must be included in an Appropriation Act under separate votes for the different heads of expenditure.
Constitutional Safeguards for Emergency Spending
This section creates a controlled flexibility mechanism allowing the government to access funds in three exceptional circumstances: unforeseen expenditures, delays in budget approval, and dissolution of Parliament. While permitting necessary government operations to continue, it imposes strict limits (1.5% cap for emergencies, 1/3 cap for delayed budgets) and requires subsequent parliamentary approval through formal Appropriation Acts. These guardrails prevent executive overreach while maintaining essential public services during fiscal uncertainties.